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 CHAPTER 4




There are very few legal theses nowadays which concentrate solely on 
legal history. However, most legal theses will have aspects of history in 
them. It is often the first response of a lawyer to trace the history of a 
particular provision or principle, in order to find its roots or its authority. 
Often, when beginning a dissertation, the law student will decide that the 
first (or easiest) task will be to look back over the history of the chosen 
aspect of the law, from its foundations to its status in the law today. 
However, while lawyers sometimes feel that history comes naturally to 
them – judges routinely trace the development of legal principles in their 
judgments, it is how we teach aspects of the law and often how we write 
about law – as Reid has warned, it only comes naturally in a certain way.1 
In criticising Chief Justice Earl Warren’s comment that ‘All lawyers are, of 
course, in some sense students of legal history’, Reid points out that lawyers 
are interested only in ‘the latest interpretation of the rule’ and are not 
worried about the rule in its original context, only ‘the net result of [its] 
evolution, the latest judicial, non-historical appraisal or interpretation of 
the rule.’2 Thus, while we may think that a legal historical approach is 
natural in legal writing, we have to consider the purpose of the approach. 
There are certain pitfalls and dangers in using a legal history approach and 
so we must be careful not to be complacent and use history for our own 
ends. As long as we are aware of the dangers, however, it will be easier to 
avoid them. In order to illustrate these dangers, we will first take a brief 
look at the use of history in legal thought.
1  J P Reid, ‘Law and History’ (1993) 27 Loyola Law Review 193, 195.
2  ibid.
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II – THE BEGINNINGS OF USING HISTORY IN LEGAL 
THOUGHT: SAVIGNY AND MAINE
Rather than trying to trace the use of history in law down through the ages, 
examining the approaches of different theorists, which, as we shall see later, 
is something one might be cautioned against doing, I will instead focus on 
the work of two very influential legal historians: Friedrich Carl von Savigny 
and Sir Henry Sumner Maine.
Savigny is often credited with being the founder of the school of ‘historical 
jurisprudence’.3 This school developed in the nineteenth century in response 
to the ‘ahistorical’, rationalist natural law approaches which prevailed at 
the time. These rationalist approaches inspired the move towards codifying 
the law in various jurisdictions such as Prussia, France and Austria.4 
Savigny disagreed with the process of codification and he argued in his 
work, Of the Vocation of our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, that a 
code which was undertaken too quickly and without proper historical 
reflection, would obscure the ‘moral energies of the nation’.5 He felt that 
first, ‘the linear lines of descent of the contemporary corpus of legal rules 
had to be traced before any legal reform along the lines of codification 
could commence.’6 This was because, according to Savigny, the material of 
the law was derived from its entire past and all legal principles have a long 
past. Which meant that the only way to ‘obtain mastery over the internal 
workings, complexities and nuances of contemporary legal rules’, was to 
examine their past.7 His method therefore, was ‘to trace legal rules, concepts 
and principles to their roots so as to locate their ‘leading axioms’’.8 As 
David Rabban has put it:
‘Savigny simply substituted historical research for philosophical analysis 
as the method for identifying the legal principles from which to deduce 
a timeless legal structure. ... [His theory] portrayed legal history as an 
unconscious and inevitable process that revealed the gradual unfolding of 
the idea of individual freedom.’9
3   D Rabban, ‘Methodology in Legal History’ in A Musson and C Stebbings (eds), Making Legal 
History; Approaches and Methodologies (Cambridge University Press 2012) 94.
4  JM Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford University Press 1992) 258ff.
5   FC Von Savigny, Of the Vocation of our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence (The Lawbook 
Exchange, Ltd. 1831) 39. Also quoted in S Kilcommins, ‘The Historical School of Jurisprudence’ 
in T Murphy (ed), Western Jurisprudence (Roundhall 2004) 144, 147. 
6  ibid.
7  ibid. 
8  ibid.
9  Rabban (n 3) 94-95. 
The Use of History in Law – Avoiding the Pitfalls
59
His central idea, which was later referred to as the Volksgeist, was the idea 
that certain laws are innate to a society – that law is ‘shaped by the nation’s 
peculiar soul’.10 Savigny saw law as something which developed organically 
with a people, much in the same way as a language develops. Therefore, 
law is not an abstract set of rules imposed on society but has deep roots in 
social and economic factors and the attitude of its past and present members 
of the society. This feeds back into his argument that codification provides 
mere verbal expression to a body of existing law, whose meaning and 
content can only be discovered by careful historical investigation.
His theory that the meaning and content of existing bodies of law could be 
analysed through research into their historical origins and development has 
been very influential.11 However, it has a number of shortcomings which 
will be of relevance to legal historians today. The main problem, as noted 
by Kilcommins, is that his theory is ‘ahistorical in design, compartmentalising 
huge tracts of history into a neat package of evolution.’12 Basically, he 
simplifies something which is actually much more complex than his 
interpretation of it. His concept of the Volksgeist is very unclear – it is not 
always possible to discern the consciousness of the people. He also over-
emphasises the importance of custom and underestimates the role of 
legislation and crucially, for our purposes, he overstates the role of history, 
as a teleological method, in interpreting the law. Significantly, his method 
reads as ‘surface narrative which, when scratched, revealed a lack of depth 
and rigour.’13 Skimming over history in this way, assuming the progression 
of time equates to progress, and forming conclusions which are not based 
on in-depth analysis of the period in time is dangerous. Thus, while he 
remains significant as one of the first proponents of the legal history 
approach, the actual approach which Savigny advocated is problematic.
There are certain similarities in the work of Maine, who like Savigny, was 
opposed to natural law and the utilitarian method. As has been pointed out, 
‘both jurists also agreed on the importance of Roman law and the merits of 
analysing legal change through an evolutionary historical lens.’14 Maine saw 
himself as a ‘scientific historian of legal evolutions’, with his analysis 
10  Kilcommins (n 5) 148.
11   JG de Montmorency, ‘Friederich Carl von Savigny’ in J McDonell and E Mason (eds), Great 
Jurists of the World, (Augustus M. Kelly 1968) 586, and KJ Smith and JPS McLaren, ‘History’s 
Living Legacy: An Outline of the ‘Modern’ Historiography of the Common Law’ (2001) 21 Legal 
Studies 251. 
12  Kilcommins (n 5) 149.
13  ibid 153.
14  ibid.
Legal Research Methods: Principles and Practicalities
60
reaching back to primitive Indo-European societies.15 Smith and McLaren 
note that from these distant origins, ‘Maine purported to demonstrate the 
emergence of ‘progressive’ societies from tribalism, customary law and 
co-ownership ... to one of individualism: famously captured as ‘a movement 
from Status to Contract’.’16 Maine’s theory was that all legal systems evolved 
in a predetermined, linear trajectory and eventually ‘would resemble each 
other in their maturity.’17 His scientific historical analysis was based on the 
notion that societies had to pass through a series of transformative stages, 
from simple stages at the beginning, which were based on arbitrary 
commands, through to the era of codes, and eventually, if the society was a 
‘progressive’ one, it would transform into a system which would employ 
Maine’s instruments of legal change: legal fictions, equity and legislation.18 
Gordon has described it as the notion that ‘the natural and proper evolution 
of a society is towards the type of liberal capitalism seen in the advanced 
Western nations.19
Maine’s comparative historical analysis may have ‘inspired over half a 
century of scholarship in history and political science’,20 but there are 
major difficulties with his approach. Smith and McLaren refer to it as ‘a 
form of anthropological Whiggism’.21 This refers to the view of history as 
a simple lineage; it involves viewing the past in terms of the ‘winners’ – 
the institutions and structures that survived – and assumes that present 
situations are the ideal result. Rather than investigating how or why things 
actually happened, it assumes a continued advance and it leads to historical 
events and concepts being divorced from their context. Maine’s evolutionary 
theory is now classed as a ‘narrative of progress’, an oversimplification 
and ahistorical analysis,22 which simplifies the past and idealises the 
inexorable march toward the future, progress, and enlightenment. As 
Kilcommins has put it, ‘Plundering history in this manner resulted in the 
distortion of the complexities and intricacies of earlier societies whilst also 
leading to a ‘complete misapprehension of the relations between the past 
and the present’.’23
15  Smith & McLaren (n 11) 256.
16  ibid 256-257.
17  P Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (Cambridge University Press 1980) 86.
18  Kilcommins (n 5) 155.
19  R Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 57, 59.
20   Smith & McLaren (n 11) 256. See also, S Collins, That Noble Science of Politics (Cambridge 
University Press 1983) ch 7. 
21  ibid.
22  Kilcommins (n 5) 165.
23  ibid, quoting H Butterfi eld, The Whig Interpretation of History (G. Bell and Sons 1963) 14. 
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So, what can we learn from these theorists? Both jurists can be commended 
for their influence and for promoting the use of history in legal thought 
and legal writing. However, both made crucial mistakes in their approaches. 
They both employed ‘presentist’ or ‘Whiggish’ histories in attempting to 
use history to explain developments in the current time. While both 
claimed to employ a ‘scientific’ approach, in fact both are guilty of using 
vague and broad notions and very little pragmatic evidence. They may 
have had the right idea in promoting the use of history in law but both fell 
into traps which we now recognise as common pitfalls for legal historians. 
We will return to these difficulties shortly, but first we must consider 
another debate in legal historical methodology – the internal versus 
external legal history debate.
III – INTERNAL V EXTERNAL LEGAL HISTORIES
Lawyers are often criticised by historians for focusing on purely internal 
approaches to legal history. The internal approach is a doctrinal one, which 
deals with sources involved in the legal process itself: cases, law reports, 
legal treatises. It is sometimes referred to, disparagingly, as ‘lawyer’s 
history’ or ‘law office history’,24 and is criticised as giving ‘a stark, 
crabbed, oversimplified picture of the past, developed largely to plead a 
case.’25 For example, under this approach, a lawyer will trawl through 
various historical examples until she finds one that justifies her case or 
proves her point, notwithstanding the fact that the example might be 
completely irrelevant when divorced from its context. External legal 
history, on the other hand, has become much more fashionable and can be 
described as ‘the history of law as embedded in its context, typically its 
social or economic context.’26 In as much as the internal approach is 
described as doctrinal, we can refer to the external approach as looking at 
the ‘law in action’ – almost a historical version of the socio-legal approach. 
As Ibbetson makes clear, ‘it is the action that matters. It is the way law 
operates in society, which seems to have law as the given and its operation 
as the thing that needs to be examined.’27 This approach is much closer to 
the method used by historians in that the law is not studied in isolation but 
within its social context, and the external legal historian is interested in the 
effect of that social context.
24  J P Reid (n 1) 197.
25   S Krislov, ‘The Amicus Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy’, in Gottfried Dietze (ed), Essays on 
the American Constitution (Prentice Hall 1964) 77. 
26   D Ibbetson, ‘What is Legal History a History of?’ in A Lewis and M Lobban (eds), Law and 
History – Current Legal Issues Vol 6 (UCL 2003) 33.
27  ibid.
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The internal approach has received a lot of bad press in recent years. 
Morton Horwitz, a leading American legal historian, of the critical school 
of legal history, has argued that to write lawyers’ history ‘is to pervert the 
real function of history by reducing it to the pathetic role of justifying the 
world as it is’.28 Another twentieth century legal historian, Roscoe Pound 
criticised the internal approach for assuming ‘that legal change is caused 
exclusively by legal phenomena and that current legal issues could be 
decided by logical deductions from past law.’29 However, these comments 
are a little harsh and while there may be some basis for the criticism of the 
way certain types of internal legal history are carried out, there is still a 
place for doctrinal legal history. In fact, there is nothing wrong with an 
internal approach – it can be the most useful approach in certain instances, 
for example, when looking at the history of private law, which often lends 
itself to such an approach. However, it must be acknowledged that this is 
the approach being taken, as otherwise, dangerous assumptions can be 
made about the meanings of past concepts, which without studying them in 
their context, may not translate easily into modern times. To take a simple 
example, today we would interpret the words ‘secret ballot’ to refer to a 
process involving complete and inviolable secrecy in voting but under the 
Irish Electoral Act 1923, there were provisions which enabled a voter’s 
ballot paper to be identified. Similarly, the word ‘child’ could refer to a 
person under the ages of 12, 16 or 18 depending on the period in time and 
the context. Therefore, it is important not to impute or assume modern 
meanings and being cognisant of such a danger will help to avoid it.
Internal history is sometimes criticised for looking at the past through the 
lens of the present. Michael Lobban has explained how to avoid this by 
reference to ‘the great lesson taught by Milsom’, another influential English 
legal historian. The lesson was that ‘legal historians who wanted to 
understand the ‘internal’ history of the law - its doctrines and practices - had 
to attempt to think like a lawyer of the age they were studying. They should 
not look at past law through the lenses of contemporary legal doctrine.’30 
Lobban explains that for Milsom, ‘legal history was therefore a form of 
intellectual history. In undertaking it, one had to grasp the fact that terms 
and concepts which hold one meaning for us held a different meaning in 
different times.’31
28  Rabban (n 3) 92.
29  R Pound, ‘The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence III’ (1912) 25 HLR 489, 514-15.
30   M Lobban, ‘The Varieties of Legal History’ (2012) 5 Revue Électronique d’Histoire du Droit para 
14 <www.cliothemis.com/The-Varieties-of-Legal-History> 
31  ibid.
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Thus, there is no reason to criticise the internal or doctrinal approach, if used 
correctly. However, there are those working under that approach who use 
history selectively for their own ends and this is what has resulted in the 
criticism and decrease in popularity of the internal approach. But this is not 
the internal approach proper. In fact, this is what we can properly label the 
so-called ‘lawyer’s history’ approach. If we separate the concept of ‘lawyer’s 
history’ from the internal approach, we can identify the approach to be 
avoided. This is the method which traces universal legal ideas and concepts 
‘through historic seams of authority in unbroken lineage and the past is 
enlisted to serve present ends.’32 In other words, a lawyer’s history approach 
does not respect history but uses examples selectively, often divorced from 
their context, simply to justify an argument in a case. Thus, an internal or 
doctrinal approach in itself is not problematic and indeed may be most useful, 
as long as the practitioner remembers that concepts must be understood in 
their own contexts, and as long as the advice of Milsom, to avoid the narrow 
‘lawyer’s history’ approach, is heeded.
IV – THINGS TO AVOID
Having looked at the methods of early legal historians and the problems 
with their approaches and taking into account the varying approaches to 
legal history, there are certain themes which come through and help us to 
identify the pitfalls in this type of methodology.
Presentism/Whig history
The first snare to avoid is that of presentism, sometimes called Whig 
history. Both Maine and Savigny were guilty of this and legal historians 
who came after them, such as Maitland, openly rejected their approach, 
which was ‘a use of the past to tell an evolutionary or teleological story for 
use ‘by modern courts to suit modern facts’’.33 It basically involves an 
assumption that society is constantly improving and, as a consequence, 
practices today are better than those of the past. It also involves interpreting 
the past in a manner consistent with present values rather than those 
relevant to the time. The term ‘Whig history’ was coined by Herbert 
Butterfield, in his 1931 book The Whig Interpretation of History,34 in which 
he criticised certain English constitutional historians for using the past to 
32   P Handler, ‘Legal History’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law 
(Routledge 2013) 85.
33   J Rose, ‘Musing on Clio: Why Study the Past, History, and Legal History’ (Fifth Annual Rare 
Books Lecture, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas School of Law, May 2009) 16, quoting 
Maitland <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1411875> 
34  H Butterfi eld, The Whig Interpretation of History (G Bell & Sons 1931).
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justify the present. Butterfield’s aim was to point out the dangers of 
glorifying and distorting the past in order to uphold a particular view of the 
present. Maitland also referred to such an approach as ‘a process of 
perversion and misunderstanding’ and insisted on ‘understanding the past 
on its own terms and in its contemporary context and ideas.’35 In a similar 
vein, the well-known British theorist, AV Dicey, was critical of the practice 
of lawyers who would ‘[retrieve] the past for normative guidance into a 
world that “is”’,36 or who believed that the function of the past was to 
elucidate the present.
In discussing this problem, Lobban refers to the linguistic philosophy of the 
positivist theorist, HLA Hart, in order to combat a Whiggish approach. Hart 
argued that ‘in order to understand legal ideas, one had to examine the use 
of particular words in context, to see the linguistic practices of a 
community.’37 Lobban points out that the lesson to be learned from Hart 
and his contemporaries of the Cambridge School is that ‘we cannot assume 
legal notions which were expressed in the past bore the same meanings as 
they do now.’38 Lobban feels that keeping this in mind may warn legal 
historians off a Whiggish approach to the subject.39 While the term ‘Whig 
history’ has certainly become a disparaging criticism of certain types of 
history, it is quite acceptable to use history to explain developments and to 
better understand the present. What is important is that an objective 
approach is maintained and that the interpretation of history is not coloured 
by the views of the present. Thus, the aspiring legal historian needs to be 
careful not to use history to simply justify the present or to see history as a 
constant and linear process.
Law and history as authority – lawyers v historians
Another danger of which legal historians must be aware is seeking to use 
legal history purely as a source of authority. In order to explain this danger, 
we need to say a little more on the debate over the different approaches of 
lawyers and historians. FW Maitland, sometimes referred to as the modern 
father of English legal history, drew a distinction between the methods of 
historians and lawyers when using history. Historians operate on the ‘logic of 
evidence’, whereas lawyers are only interested in ‘the logic of authority’. 
35  ibid.
36   A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan and Co 1885). See 
also, (10th edn, Macmillan 1959) 22.
37   Lobban in A Lewis and M Lobban (eds), Law and History – Current Legal Issues Vol 6 (UCL 
2003) 2-3. 
38  ibid 4.
39  ibid.
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Prest puts the theory well in describing how Maitland sees historians and 
lawyers as operating on ‘quite distinct wavelengths, using two different 
modes of argument’.40 He states further that:
Laywers, according to Maitland, are primarily interested in finding legal 
authorities, the more recent the better, with which to support the cases of 
their clients. Historians, on the other hand, recognize themselves as bound 
by no authority, except evidence bearing on the event or phenomena they 
study; generally speaking, the closer that evidence in time to their subject, 
the greater its credibility and utility.41
Reid has also discussed this difference in approach, arguing that crossing 
history with law is a dangerous enterprise ‘containing more snares than 
rewards, as it risks confusing the rules of evidence basic to one profession 
with canons of proof sacrosanct to another.’42 He points out that ‘Lawyers, to 
function as lawyers, do not have to learn anything of sixteenth-century law, 
or of the rule’s subsequent historical evolution. All that lawyers need care 
about is the net result of that evolution, the latest judicial nonhistorical 
appraisal or interpretation of the rule.’43 Reid accepts that the lawyer and 
historian both go to the past for evidence but he feels the similarity ends 
there. He also cites Maitland’s argument that while the historian weighs 
every bit of evidence which comes to hand, the lawyer is only interested in 
the single authority that will settle the case at hand.44
Gough has provided an interesting illustration of this: ‘In the English 
lawyer’s view, a judge who applies a law to a fresh case elucidates what was 
always, potentially as it were, the law on that particular matter.’45 In other 
words, the lawyer is interested in the final or ‘true’ interpretation of the rule 
whereas a historian will be interested to know what the rule meant to each 
generation to which it applied. The danger here is that the lawyer, in her 
search for authority, will ‘commingle the current interpretation of the law 
with the historical interpretation.’46
40   W Prest, ‘Law for Historians: William Blackstone on Wives, Colonies and Slaves’ (2007) 11 Legal 
History 105. 
41  ibid. 
42  Reid (n 1) 193.
43  ibid 195.
44  ibid 196.
45  J W Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Clarendon Press 1985) 6-7.
46  Reid (n 1) 197.
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The greatest danger however, in this search for authority rather than 
evidence, is highlighted by Reid and it happens when history is used, ‘not 
to learn about the past, but merely to support an outcome.’ In most cases, 
when this approach is employed, the decision has already been formulated 
and the history is a convenient way of justifying the decision.47 Gordon 
refers to this phenomenon as a search for legitimacy: ‘It reassures us that 
what we do now flows continuously out of our past, out of precedents, 
traditions, fidelity to statutory and Constitutional texts and meanings.’48 
However, just because something happened and was accepted in the past 
does not give it a legitimacy today. To take such an approach would mean 
that the law would never change. Take for example, the law on marital rape, 
which was accepted and upheld through historic precedents for years until 
the exemption which allowed the practice was finally abolished in 1991.49 
Thus, lawyers have to be very careful in using history as authority or 
legitimacy for some current legal rule.
History as a search for truth
Linked to this is the idea, which lawyers sometimes have, of finding legal 
‘truth’ in the past. Daniel Boorstin has labelled this as a kind of ‘legal 
embryology’,50 which is described as ‘a search in the rudimentary forms of 
the past for the origins and growth of the more fully developed law of the 
present, often presented as ‘the inevitable culmination of this process.’’51 
Musson and Stebbings have also addressed this:
‘Legal historians, however, can show that legal ‘truth’ is no more in the 
past than in the present and that a historical framework must take account 
of a number of different legalities. Indeed, they embrace a different kind 
of truth – a historical ‘truth’ that accepts uncertainty and appreciates the 
contingency of legal authority and the sometimes shaky foundations of 
the law (which lawyers rarely admit).’52
However, some, such as Prest, argue that Maitland and others have overstated 
the ‘propensity of lawyers to misread and misuse history’ and have 
exaggerated the gap between legal and historical reasoning.53 Personally, I 
would agree: in my experience, lawyers very often make excellent legal 
47  ibid 204.
48  R Gordon, ‘The Arrival of Critical Historicism’ (1997) 49 Stan L Rev 1023. 
49  R v R [1992] 1 AC 599. 
50  D J Boorstin, ‘Tradition and Method in Legal History (1941) 54 HLR 424, 429.
51  Rabban (n 3) 92.
52  Musson and Stebbings (n 3) 4.
53  Prest (n 39) 105.
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historians. As Handler has emphasised, it is not necessary to acquire a degree 
in history in order to employ historical methodologies, as long as legal 
historians are ‘mindful of the ever-present, if not entirely avoidable, risk of 
being ‘enticed into carrying concepts and even social frameworks back into 
periods to which they do not belong’.’54 A useful suggestion by Handler for 
the aspiring legal historian aiming to avoid these difficulties is to engage in a 
meaningful dialogue with experts in different fields – sage advice indeed.
V – THINGS TO REMEMBER
To sum up, employing a legal history methodology can be a very useful and 
rewarding process. However, as with any methodology, there are various 
matters which must be carefully considered before embarking on such an 
approach.
First, one must take care not to glorify the past. As legal historians, we have 
to remain objective and detached. Nostalgia is not the friend of the legal 
historian! Furthermore, when interpreting history, we have to be aware of 
our own standpoints and biases. In order to adequately interpret the past, it 
is first necessary to identify our own perspectives and how these might 
influence our interpretation. As Prest notes, ‘the past is gone forever, and we 
can never hope to “reconstruct” it in all its complexity. But this does not 
mean that we are free to treat it as blank canvas for our own creative 
imaginations or present-day preoccupations to work upon – at least if we 
aspire to call the result history, not fiction or polemic.’55 We must endeavour 
to provide a fair interpretation of legal history. That is, an interpretation 
which best reflects what contemporary agents understood the law to be.56
As we have seen, it is also necessary to avoid an interpretation which sees 
history as a narrative of progress, as did Maine. As has been noted above, 
there is an argument that lawyers have a tendency to ‘misuse history by 
attempting to make what is complex and multifaceted into a linear 
progress’.57 However, this is also easy to avoid as long as one is aware of 
the tendency. Karl Marx famously saw history as a march of progress and 
believed that our experiences would eventually lead to a new and improved 
future. However, this simplifies history and denigrates and distorts the 
54   See Handler (n 32) 96, quoting S F C Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (2nd ed, 
Butterworths 1981) vi. 
55  Prest in Musson and Stebbings (n 3) 210.
56   M Lobban, ‘Introduction: The Tools and Tasks of the Legal Historian’ in M Lobban and 
A Lewis (eds), Law and Legal History (OUP 2004) 1. 
57  ibid 13. 
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complexities of earlier societies and their practices. We cannot assume that 
what happens today is somehow better than what happened in the past just 
because time has moved on. The passage of time does not necessarily equate 
to improvement in law and society.
We must also consider that, if the past is a foreign country, then it is necessary 
to learn the language in order to get by. This means learning about the 
meaning of words, concepts and principles in their own contexts rather than 
assuming the modern meaning. Gordon gives an example of the meaning of 
the word ‘Liberty’ in the eighteenth century as opposed to its modern 
meaning.58 Adopting an external approach may avoid this. In fact, Lobban 
argues that it is only with the aid of the external perspective that we can make 
sense of the internal developments.59
It is also important to avoid prefatory histories. This is a danger in theses 
and dissertations which are not focused purely on legal history, but which 
draw on history in some way. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
often the first response of a lawyer is to begin her research by tracing the 
history of her particular subject. However, if this history serves no other 
purpose than as padding, or as a way of easing into the central question, 
then it is a prefatory history, which is not useful. Often, all this will do is 
use up precious word limits. If you intend to introduce your topic by 
drawing on its history, then make sure the history is relevant to the central 
question. On the other hand, a relevant historical introduction can be very 
useful and can contribute significantly to the understanding of the concept 
at issue.
So, these are all the things to avoid when using history in law, which 
raises the question of how history should be used. Very simply, history 
should be used for its own sake. It can be used to demonstrate the 
conditions of emergence of a particular law or practice, in order to better 
understand it. It can also be used to demonstrate how thinking might have 
changed on an issue or even to highlight an injustice. Oliver Wendell 
Holmes was very careful about his use of history, stating in his work, 
Common Law: ‘I shall use the history of our law so far as it is necessary to 
explain a conception or to interpret a rule, but no further.’60 Perhaps this 
approach is a little overly-cautious. Pound was more optimistic about the 
use of history when he reasoned it should be used to ‘illustrate ... how 
58  Gordon (n 47) 1025.
59  Lobban (n 56) 28.
60  O W Holmes, Common Law (American Bar Association 1881) 5. 
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legal precepts – rules, principles, conceptions and standards – have met 
concrete situations of fact in organising human society in the past and 
enabling or helping us to judge how we may deal with such situations with 
some assurance in the present.’61 As long as the danger of removing 
meanings from their original historical setting is avoided, such an 
enterprise is entirely possible. Handler suggests that one function of legal 
history is to challenge the assumptions that inform and underpin modern 
legal scholarship. He points out that: ‘It is a commonplace of legal 
argument to refer to the historical pedigree of a particular rule or institution 
as an indicator of its strength and value.’ In response to this, legal history 
can serve as a ‘useful myth dispelling function ... [by] testing the validity 
of claims using historical evidence.’62 Handler also notes that scrutinising 
past law in its historical context can also reveal errors in current thinking 
or cause us to question analytical models.63 History can be used in legal 
writing in lots of different ways and as long as the advice above is borne 
in mind, it can be a very worthwhile pursuit.
61   R Pound, ‘Introduction’ in F Pollock and F W Maitland, The History of English Law before the 
time of Edward I (2nd edn, Washington 1959). 
62  Handler (n 32) 95. 
63  ibid.

